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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 388

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 10/06/2003

Where it occurred: Al Zubyaer Distruct,
Basrah Governorate

Country: Iraq

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Demolition accident

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 25/06/2003

ID original source: BoI 03-001

Name of source: RMACT/UNDP

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Ordnance

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 22/02/2004

No of victims: 0

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude: 47° 41' 35"

Latitude: 30° 32' 59"

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
non injurious accident (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
A Board of Inquiry report was made available in January 2004. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The photographs referenced were not made available.

Board of Inquiry 03-001: Ammunition incident [demining group] 10th June 2003
President: [Name excised] Mine Action Advisor UNDP Iraq
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Member: [Name excised], EOD supervisor-SRSA Iraq
Governorate: Basrah, District: Al Zubyaer, Village: N/A
EOD site: Lat 30.32.59 Long.47.41.35
Signed: Basrah 25 June 2003

Content list
Annexes [Not made available.]
1. Definitions
2. Initial investigation report by RMACT
3. Conveying order for BOI with TOR
4. Statement by EOD Team 3 Leader [Name excised]
5. Statement by EOD manager [Demining group] Iraq [Name excised]
6. Statement by EOD Team 3 2I/C [Name excised]
7. Statement by EOD Team 3 Medic [Name excised]
8. Statement by EOD Team 3 Interpreter [Name excised]

Introduction
On 10 June 2003 [Demining group] reported an ammunition bunker had spontaneously
detonated in the Basrah area. RRMACT initiated an investigation. The investigation
concluded the spontaneously detonation was caused by [demining group] EOD Team 3. The
incident occurred during an Explosive Ordnance (EO) clearance operation in a warehouse.
RRMACT initiated a BOI.
This report covers the incident, immediate actions taken by [Demining group] after the
incident, the management issues leading to this incident and the training preparations
conducted by [demining group].

Summary
The result of this accident is alarming. Although only property damage occurred, this incident
could have been prevented. Within a month of entering Iraq, [the demining group] providing
humanitarian mine action, made this EO removal task into a far more hazardous and
demanding task. It is now a much more technical complicated task with increased risks for
people using the area.
The BOI conclude that during EOD Team 3 demolition of two Sagger missiles 105 metres
from the ammunition warehouse, the resulting demolition caused a hot fragment to jump into
the scattered propellant laying outside the entrance of the warehouse. This initiated a
propellant fire.
[Demining group] EOD Team Leader 3 did not adhere to [demining group] SOPs and did not
apply common sense for this EOD task. [Name excised], the Team Leader of EOD 3,
resigned shortly after the incident and left the country before conducting this BOI.
On close inspection of [the demining group]’s SOPs, it is evident the SOPs are limited when it
comes to EOD/EOC operations.
Furthermore, [demining group] did not train and prepare their EOD staff entering Iraq in
accordance with their [demining group] Training SOP, which requires five days in-country
training.
The BOI concludes the reasons to this incident as a combination of several causes:
Poor judgment of the Team Leader non compliance to [demining group] SOP.
[Demining group] management did not adhere to their own training SOP to prepare
employees for Iraq.
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[Demining group] SOPs do not cover more advanced EOD OPS (only BAC and very
simple disposal through demolition).
[Demining group] has unclear QA/QC procedures when it comes to EOD OPS.
[Demining group] OPS Iraq management exercise minimal control of its EOD OPS.

Method of investigation
The BOI received the Convening Order on 14 June 2003. The investigation commenced on
15 June 2003 with gathering earlier reports and other essential information for the BOI. (see
Annexes 1, 2 and 4 [not made available]). A field visit was conducted 16th June to the
accident site.
On 18th June, statements where obtained from [name excised], [Demining group] EOD
Manager; [name excised], 2I/C EOD Team 3; [name excised], EOD Team 3 Medic and
interpreter, [name excised]. (Annexes 5—8). In addition, interviews where made with
[demining group] PM, [four names excised].
The report was to be complete by 19 June 1800 hours, however due to several unforeseen
factors the completion date was amended to 25 June. Further discussions with [Demining
group] PM [name excised] on 22nd June concentrated on the SOPs.
On 23rd June, RRMACT received complementary documentation to [Demining group] SOPs.
The document received was the British Army’s Ammunition and Explosives Regulations.

Incident facts
On 10th June 2003, [demining group] EOD Team Echo 3 were conducting a clearance
operation on a building used by the Iraqi Forces to store ammunition of mixed natures.
This building was looted and as a result propellant from the ammunition was scattered in the
immediate area and the confines of the building. This building was located at GPS Lat
30.32.59 Long. 47.41.35.
At approximately 10:35hrs, a fierce fire was detected outside the building immediately after
the demolition by detonation of 2 Sagger missiles. The fire spread rapidly to inside the
building and several loud explosions where seen and heard to take place.
Picture 1 Overview of warehouse after incident
There were no casualties but the building was totally destroyed, the roof collapsed onto
several hundred items of ammunition.
[Demining group] did not seal the site and no initial investigation was conducted by [demining
group] in accordance with [demining group] SOP 26 and IMAS 10.60 Reporting Investigation.
An investigation team was dispatched from the RMACT on the 11th June to determine the
cause of the incident which had initially been reported as a ‘cook off’. The RMACT was shown
the site of the incident by [the demining group PM]. Also present was the [demining group]
EOD Team Leader and his Deputy.

Explosive Ordnance involved
The ammunition involved was a mix of several types laying in a thick layer of loose propellant
(cordite). For more details see Annex 4, [name excised]’s statement. [Annex not made
available.]

Priority of task
This task was identified as a priority task for the local population. Looting in the area created a
second dangerous hazard area by breaking down the munitions and spreading propellant
over the adjacent areas.
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At the site, the Team Leader correctly identified propellant as being very dangerous in its
unpacked and exposed condition but only removed it in order to gain access to the relatively
safe and stable stocks of ammunition.
Picture 2 Collapsed building on top of Ammunition
Picture 3 Ammunition at the warehouse

Quality assurance and Quality control
No documented QA or QC has been presented.
The Team Leader was present during all demining activities. According to [EOD Team 3
2I/C] and the national interpreter, no [demining group] in-country management visited EOD
Team 3 at any work site since start of EOD Team 3 EOD OPS in Iraq. [Demining group PM]
stated during a discussion with him 22 June, that three attempts by [demining group] incountry management were made prior to the incident, however due to various reasons it
never occurred.

[Demining group] on site Work Documentation
No existing work documentation such as site diagrams or sketches were evident.

Tasking procedures
The tasking procedure can be outlined as follows:
RMACT provides the Dangerous Area Reports to [demining group].
[Demining group] (Programme Manager) issues the task (Dangerous Area Report) to the
team leaders.
The tasked Team Leader conducts the clearance operation (EOD).
This process occurred for this task.

Geography and weather
The area is an ammunition storage area located on flat and arid terrain. The weather on 10
June 2003 was sunny, temperature between 40 to 48 degrees Celsius with light wind.

Training
Individual skills
According to the involved key staff CVs, they have both technical and supervisor experience
within demining (EOD) OPS.

[Demining group] preparation for clearance OPS in Iraq
It is important to note that the [Demining group] international supervisors assembled for this
mission have been assembled from a diverse background. The 2IC had previous experience
in Iraq. The 2I/C came to Zimbabwe the day before [Demining group] team departed for Iraq.
The training before entering Iraq seemed to concentrate on [Demining group] SOPs.
Based on the answers during the BOI interviews with the PM, OPS Manager, [Team medic]
and [Team 3/2IC], the following training over two days was conducted in country:
In country Health, medical, hygiene, nutrition and heat deceases.
Mine detector/bomb locator training.
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According to [Demining group] training SOP 34:
“Proper training is the first essential step in the overall process and must be carried out using
professional training staff, in an environment conducive to training. Rigidity of training
standards and discipline is fundamental in mine clearance operations.”
SOP 34, 5:
“Where the company enters a new theatre of operations the entire contingent will undergo a 5
day in-country retraining and orientation. This will include lectures from in-country specialists.”
[Demining group] used only two days of in-country retraining and orientation out of the
recommended 5 days according to [Demining group] SOP 34 para 5.

Site layout and marking
No formal site layout was established or marked. [Demining group] does not have any SOPs
to cover this type of EOC/EOD operations.

Management, supervision and discipline on site
The on site supervision consisted of two international site supervisors with international EOD
operators and one medic. There were no field visits by [Demining group] management to any
EOD Team 3 sites since start of operations in Iraq.
The site discipline was unclear and according to EOD Team 3 2I/C’s statement, the Team
Leader conducted burning of propellant without warning to all personnel at the site. This
indicates normal site discipline was not adhered to.
Concerning safety distances or protection of staff during this demolition, this has not been
investigated due to the shortage of time and transport assets. After reading the statements it
seems that the safety distance and protection can be questioned. This need to be addressed
in future SOP improvement.

Adherence to the SOP and IMAS
Team Leader of EOD Team 3 did not follow [Demining group] SOP concerning high order
demolition of UXO safety distances. Concerning burning of propellant, [Demining group]
SOPs do not cover this subject. This is an essential element given the presence of this
material found throughout this region of Iraq.
[Demining group] did not adhere to their SOPs concerning the 5 day in-country retraining and
orientation. Furthermore, [Demining group] investigating procedures were not followed.

Communications and reporting
Communications to [Demining group] base Iraq is by UHF radio and constant contact is
maintained.

Medical, including injuries sustained
Medic on site, no injuries sustained.

Equipment and tools
No key equipment or tools have been involved in the incident.

Possible causes of the incident
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This BOI concludes that a hot fragment from the high order demolition of the Sagger missiles
landed in the propellant at the ammunition store. This hot fragment initiated the propellant
causing some of the ammunition to cock off.
It is clear to this BOI that the Team Leader did not adhere to [Demining group] SOP safety
distances concerning high order demolitions. The Team Leader showed poor judgment during
the conduct of this kind of EOD operation.
When it comes to burning of propellant, [Demining group] SOPs do not cover this subject. The
[Demining group] SOPs mainly address mine field clearance OPS and are weak concerning
EOD OPS. [Demining group] SOPs are mainly for EOD with in BAC or minefield clearance.
One possible reason could be the lack of a proper EOD SOPs with a clear EOD OPS
concept.
According to [Demining group] OPS Manager at a meeting on 12 June (two operational days
after the incident) [Demining group] country management concluded:
“All propellant gathered for a controlled burn must not be closer than 100m from any
other cordite propellant or unexploded ordnances, and that the depth of propellant to
be burnt is not to exceed a height of 200mm”
The UK Ammunition and Explosive Regulations states:
“The danger area to be observed for a particular propellant burn is to be determined
by the SATO and is dependent upon the nature, type and quantity of propellant to be
burnt. As a guide, the recommended radius of the danger area is 50 m for every 500
kg to be burnt, maintaining a minimum safety distance of 100 m. Common sense and
experience must be used when applying this guide to large burns.”
In light of the above statements, the BOI recommends no propellant burning within 500m from
other flammable or hazardous items/installations or facilities.

Conclusions
The Board of Inquiry has concluded the following:
1. [Demining group] is directly responsible for this incident, which could have been prevented
with adequate training and supervision.
2. Team Leader of EOD 3 has resigned as an immediate action taken by [Demining group].
3. [Demining group] does not have SOPs or proper concept of EOD/EOC operations covering
this type of activity.
4. [Demining group] management lacks adequate internal QC procedures for EOD tasks.
5. [Demining group] management did not follow their training SOP with the prescribed 5 day
in-country retraining and orientation in country.
6. [Demining group] did not adhere to their SOP 26 or IMAS 10.60 Reporting Investigation,
paragraph 5.2.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are made:
1. [Demining group] should review and amend their SOPs in order to reflect the EOD
operations.
2. [Demining group] should review and amend their concept of EOD operations in order to
ensure controlled, sound, efficient and safe EOD operations.
3. [Demining group] review operational procedures and safety distances for propellant burns
and
demolition at sites containing other flammable or hazardous items/installations or facilities
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4. [Demining group] should conduct in country training to meet conditions outlined in
paragraphs (1) and (2) above.
5. [Demining group] should strengthen their internal QA and QC procedures for EOD ops.
6. [Demining group] should strengthen their EOD management capability in order to control
and improve operations.
7. [Demining group] shall adhere to [Demining group] SOP 26 and IMAS 10.60 paragraph 5.2
if an incident occurs in the future.
8. [Demining group] should establish and present a plan how to achieve the above
recommendations. The plan should be presented and approved by the MA authority or
RMACT.
9. RMACT should report findings of this investigation to all demining organisations operating
in the country.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “inadequate training” because the investigators
determined that the personnel involved were not appropriately trained for the work. The
secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the investigators
determined that appropriate SOPs and training were not made available to the staff involved.
However, the CVs of the senior field staff may have led the senior managers to believe that
they were suitably experienced and trained to develop appropriate SOPs and field-training
without their involvement.
The fact that the national authority investigated this non-injurious accident is unusual but very
appropriate. Their findings may help to prevent similar accidents occurring in future.
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